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NOTE
Where the Reason Stops: Babcock v. State
Establishes an Unjustified Immunity for
Foster-Care Placement
America's massive foster-care system has become so
overburdened that it is threatening the welfare of thousands
of children that it is supposed to protect. The system is in
such disarray that many experts now say that in too many
cases state custody is as harmful to the children as are the
abusive homes from which they are taken.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the problems facing the nation's child pro-
tection services, the Washington Supreme Court has lowered
the protection for children in foster-care by granting absolute
immunity from negligence liability to the caseworkers who
recommend foster-care placement.2 In Babcock v. State, the
court refused to distinguish the role Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS) caseworkers performed during the ini-
tiation of a dependency proceeding from the role they perform
during a foster-care placement proceeding.3 Instead, the court
granted blanket protection to all of the caseworker's actions-
from initiating proceedings to investigating placement-under
the aegis of judicial immunity.4
This Note will argue that the Babcock court's application
of this immunity fails to serve the traditional goals of judicial
immunity and undermines the factors that should protect
dependent children. This argument will develop by first con-
sidering the development of judicial immunity and the signifi-
1. C. Sullivan, America's Troubled Children: Wards of the State, Christian Science
Monitor, Sept. 27, 1988, at B2, col. 1.
2. Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989); later proceeding,
Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 104, 768 P.2d at 493.
4. Id.
384 University of Puget Sound Law Review
cance of the concept of functional comparability. The Note
will then begin the discussion of the Babcock case with an
explanation of the nature of a dependency proceeding and the
duties performed by a caseworker during initiation of a depen-
dency proceeding and during placement in foster-care. The
Note will then consider the caseworker's actions in the Bab-
cock case and that court's application of judicial immunity. It
will show that the extension of judicial immunity to investiga-
tive and ministerial duties fails to fulfill the policies behind the
grant of immunity.
The Note will then show that the application of ordinary
negligence principles would serve to protect the legitimate con-
cerns raised by the court while providing protection to children
who may be placed at risk by DSHS. The Note will conclude
that the court should balance the need to protect caseworkers'
decision-making ability with the need to protect the children in
the state's care. The result of this balancing would allow the
limited application of immunity to the initiation of a depen-
dency proceeding and the application of traditional negligence
analysis to foster-care placement.
II. JUDICIAL ImmUNrrY
A. The Development of Judicial Immunity
The concept of judicial immunity from civil liability is
deeply entrenched.' It was first developed to protect judges
from liability in civil actions for any judicial action taken
within their jurisdiction. 6 Courts used the doctrine to protect
judicial decision-making because of the recognized need for
judges to exercise discretion within their role.7 Judges must be
able to make decisions without the threat of a civil suit.' Addi-
5. See Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980
DUKE L. REv. 879 (tracing judicial immunity back to Lord Coke's decision in Floyd v.
Barker, 77 Eng. Rep, 1305 (Star Chamber 1607)). The Supreme Court first faced the
issue of judicial immunity in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868) in which
the Court concluded that the judge was not liable for his judicial acts unless the acts
were done maliciously and in excess of jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Court even
removed the possibility of judicial liability for malicious acts. Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
6. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868); Note, What Constitutes a
Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1503 (1985).
7. Comment, Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of Tyranny From the
Bench?, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 810, at 812 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 (13 Wall.) 335
(1871)).
8. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978).
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tionally, judicial economy disfavors re-litigating a suit through
an action against the judge.9 Because of these concerns, judges
are accorded absolute immunity from civil suit for actions
taken within their official capacity.10
While quite broad, immunity is not unlimited in scope. It
covers acts that are "judicial" and within the general scope of
the court's jurisdiction, even if the acts are done in bad faith or
with a corrupt or malicious motive."' However, a judge may be
liable for conduct not constituting a judicial act.' 2 For exam-
ple, judges may be liable for acts that are ministerial in nature
rather than judicial. 3 Examples of ministerial acts include
chairing meetings outside of the courtroom, 14 forcibly remov-
ing a person from the courtroom and physically assaulting
him,15  and participating in employment decisions.16  Ulti-
[A] general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration
of justice [is] that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
[should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871), quoted in Stump, 435 U.S. at 363.
9. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 103, 768 P.2d at 492. See also Brazier, Judicial
Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary, 1976 PUB. L. 397.
10. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judge immune for issuing ex
parte order to sterilize a minor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police justice
immune for convicting freedom riders for breach of the peace); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (judge immune for striking attorney's name from the roll of
attorneys practicing before the court).
11. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 1057 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
12. Id. at 1058-59.
13. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988). The distinction may be considered
discretionary versus non-discretionary. 'To fulfill his discretionary role, the judge
must use his personal judgment in performing the act; in his ministerial role, the judge
is required by law to perform certain acts in specific ways." Note, Immunity of Federal
and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 727, 729-30 (1977). Discretionary decisions are protected by immunity.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). However, the basis for immunity, which
is the need to preserve the independence of judicial decision-making, does not carry
over to ministerial acts. For example, the method by which an investigation is
conducted has more guidelines than the decision of whether to initiate it and may be
seen as administrative. Administrative acts are considered non-discretionary and are
not immunized. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(D), comment h (1979)
(examples of administrative or ministerial acts include registration of voters, recording
of documents, care of prisoners, driving of vehicle and collection of taxes).
14. Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1970).
15. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974).
16. Forrester, 484 U.S. 219. The Forrester Court focused on the "nature of the
functions" that an official performs and whether the application of immunity would
protect that function, rather than on the identity of the official. Id. at 224. The Court
rejected the argument that the judge's employment decision should be immunized
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mately, the issue of whether a judge's actions require sufficient
discretion to warrant a grant of judicial immunity is one of
degree.17
B. Functional Comparability
Based on the functional comparability of their roles to that
of a judge, other participants in judicial proceedings have also
been granted absolute immunity. Functional comparability,
although not clearly defined in the cases, involves a compari-
son of the role performed and the judicial interests protected
by immunity."8 The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the
functional comparability approach in Imbler v. Pachtman, in
which the Court pronounced that "[i]t is the functional compa-
rability of their judgments to those of the judge that has
resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to
as 'quasi-judicial' officers and their immunities being termed'quasi-judicial' as well."' 9
In Imbler, a criminal defendant brought a civil rights
action against the state prosecutor for damages resulting from
an alleged unlawful prosecution. The Imbler Court held that a
state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his
duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal case was absolutely
immune from civil liability.20 The Court stated that absolute
immunity was appropriate for conduct "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process."'" The Imbler
Court based the extension of judicial immunity to other par-
ticipants in the judicial process, or "quasi-judicial" immunity,
on the same principles that underlie the traditional grant of
immunity for judges.22 These principles "include concern that
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of
the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possi-
simply because the employee aided the judge in the performance of adjudicative
functions. Id at 222. "Absolute immunity ... is 'strong medicine, justified only when
the danger of [officials' being] deflect[ed from the effective performance of their
duties] is very great.'" Id at 230 (quoting 792 F.2d 647, 660 (1986) (Posner, J.,
dissenting)).
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 895(D), comment h (1979).
18. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
19. Id. at 423 n.20.
20. Id. at 430. The Court reserved judgment on whether absolute immunity
extended to those aspects of a prosecutor's duties which cast him in the role of an
investigative officer, rather than an advocate. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 422-23.
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bility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising
the independence of judgment required by his public trust."'
The Imbler Court specifically limited its holding so that
the prosecutor was granted absolute immunity only for his acts
in initiating and prosecuting a criminal action.' By so limiting
its holding, the Imbler Court implied that the prosecution of an
action may include activities outside the courtroom for which a
prosecutor might be immune. However, the Court also recog-
nized that "[a]t some point, and with respect to some decisions,
the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather
than as an officer of the court."' For acts which may be min-
isterial in nature, and consequently not subject to judicial
immunity, the Court refused to consider whether absolute
immunity should be applied.26
Subsequently, the Court has clarified the application of
functional comparability. In Butz v. Economou,27 a futures
merchant brought an action against the Department of Agri-
culture and others, seeking damages on the ground that the
defendant had wrongfully initiated administrative proceedings
against the merchant. In reaching its decision, the Court
developed a two-part test for functional comparability.28 First,
the Court compared the officials' powers and duties to those
performed by officials already protected by judicial immu-
nity. 9 Second, if the duties were analogous to duties already
subject to immunity, the Court would then determine whether
the existence of institutional safeguards were sufficient to min-
imize the risks of bias.'
23. Id. at 423.
24. Id. at 430.
25. Id. at 431 n.33.
26. Id.; see also discussion of ministerial acts, supra note 13.
27. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
28. Id. Arguably, the Butz decision entailed a three-part test: before determining
if the function was comparable to a judicial act and if institutional controls were
sufficient to minimize possible bias, the Court first determined whether absolute
immunity was even necessary to protect the official from liability. Note, Quasi-
Judicial Immunity of State Officials: Butz v. Eonomou's Distorted Legacy, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 401, 418. For some officials, qualified immunity was adequate protection
from liability for mere mistakes and, therefore, absolute immunity was not granted.
Butz, 438 U.S. at 507. Qualified immunity protects officals from civil liability unless
the official violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The burden
is on the official claiming absolute immunity to prove that a grant of qualified
immunity will provide inadequate protection. Id. at 812-13.
29. E.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-14.
30. Id. at 512-514.
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In order to determine whether the role of a given official
is functionally comparable to a role traditionally granted judi-
cial immunity, the Butz Court looked to whether the roles
being compared performed the same duties and sought the
same goals."' Thus, the concept of functional comparability
focuses upon the character of the conduct for which the immu-
nity is claimed.3 2 That conduct must be such an integral part
of the judicial process that the integrity of the process itself
requires a grant of judicial immunity.33
In Butz, the Court granted absolute immunity to an
administrative hearing officer's performance of functions
which were substantially similar to those for which judges tra-
ditionally received immunity. 4  The hearing officer, like a
judge, ruled on the evidence presented, regulated the course of
the hearing, and made decisions or recommendations.' The
Court found that "[more importantly, the process of agency
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the
hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the
evidence before him .... ,3 The Court additionally noted that
31. Id.
32. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (citing Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)). Courts
have often termed conduct that has traditionally been treated as immune as "quasi-
judicial" in order to distinguish it from investigative conduct. Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). The proper
focus, therefore, is on the character of the conduct. Id. "[Wihen the prosecuting
attorney acts in some capacity other than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason
for his immunity-integral relationship between his acts and the judicial process-
ceases to exist." Id. (quoting Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965)). In
Hampton, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the drafting of a search
warrant by the state attorneys was not sufficiently related to the judicial process to
warrant a grant of absolute immunity. Id. at 609.
The Imbler Court also implicitly acknowledged that the focus upon the functional
nature of the conduct allows a distinction between certain kinds of conduct. The
Court distinguished the conduct for which it would grant absolute immunity, activities
intimately associated with the judicial process, from the conduct that might be entitled
only to a qualified immunity, activities commonly associated with investigation.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. The Court specifically left standing those cases holding that
prosecutors were entitled to only a qualified immunity for investigative activities. Id.
See also Hampton, 484 F.2d 602; Robichaud, 351 F.2d 533; Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d
1249 (1st Cir. 1974); cf. Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969); Lewis v.
Brautigan, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955); accord Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir.
1987); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2nd Cir. 1986); Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d
990 (3rd Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindiest, 599 F.2d 1203 (3rd Cir. 1979).
33. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
34. Butz, 438 U.S. at 511, 513.
35. Id. at 513.
36. Id.
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agency hearings, like other court proceedings, are subject to
the contention that malice affected the judgment.' 7 The Court
then concluded that the hearing examiner, like a judge, needed
protection from the fear of liability in order to exercise
independent judgment on the evidence before him.' There-
fore, a grant of judicial immunity protected the hearing exam-
iner's ability to make decisions on the merits, the same
function for which a judge is protected.'
Furthermore, the Court also granted immunity to the
agency attorney for actions analogous to those of a prosecu-
tor.4° The agency attorney, like a prosecutor, had to decide
whether to initiate an action.4' Also like a prosecutor, the
agency attorney needed to make that decision from the evi-
dence rather than from fear of a retaliatory civil suit.' The
function the Court sought to protect, therefore, was the agency
attorney's ability to initiate meritorious actions.43
Thus, the Butz Court found the roles of the hearing exam-
iner and the agency attorney sufficiently comparable to those
of a judge and a prosecutor. In both situations, the partici-
pants' actions occurred in the course of an adjudicative pro-
ceeding and were analogous to the conduct traditionally
subject to absolute immunity. In addition, by granting absolute
immunity to the hearing officer and the agency attorney, the
Butz Court sought to protect the need to make a meritorious
decision. The Butz Court implied that if the only significant
difference between the roles of the officials to which it granted
immunity and the role of a judge is the location of the hearing,
the immunity should be applied.44
After examining the functional comparability of the roles
of the participants, the Butz Court then inquired into the exist-
ence of institutional controls that reduce the risk of abuse of
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 512.
40. Id. at 515 (construing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).
41. Id.
42. id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 512. See also Note, supra note 28, at 419. The Butz Court did not,
however, grant absolute immunity to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture, who were also defendants to the suit. Butz, 438 U.S. at
507. Those officials had filed an administrative complaint against the plaintiff, seeking
to revoke the plaintiff's registration as a commodities merchant. The Court held that
they were only entitled to a qualified immunity for that action. Id.
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power.' The control of precedent and the appeal process
check the power of judges; professional obligations and the
adversary nature of a trial check the power of advocates;
finally, cross-examination and the penalty of perjury check the
power of witnesses at trial." The Court stated that because
these characteristics of the judicial process enhance the relia-
bility of information and the impartiality of the decision-mak-
ing process, there is a lesser need for individual suits to act as a
check on judicial action.47 Thus, when both functionally com-
parable duties and institutional controls are present, immunity
may be properly applied to protect judicial interests.
III. STATE V. BABCOCK
A. Introduction
In State v. Babcock,4 the Washington Supreme Court
applied a broad interpretation of judicial immunity to the
actions of caseworkers during foster-care placement. By broad-
ening this interpretation, the court ignored the distinction
between a caseworker's duties during the initiation of a depen-
dency proceeding and during the investigation of foster-care
placement. Before discussing the application of immunity in
the Babcock case, however, a discussion of the rudiments of
dependency proceedings and foster care placement is
necessary.
B. Dependency Proceedings and Foster-Care Placement
A dependency proceeding is the process by which the
state, through the DSHS, assumes a legal interest in a child
when there is no parent or guardian able to care for the
child.49 The establishment of a dependency creates a legal sta-
tus which imposes certain rights and duties on the state
45. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989).
49. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 13.34 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Dependency proceedings
are heard by the juvenile court, which has exclusive original jurisdiction. WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.04.030. See In re Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash. 2d 331, 340, 413 P.2d 940,
945 (1966), modtfed on rehg 70 Wash. 2d 349, 352, 422 P.2d 783, 787 (1967); In re
Walker v. Superior Court, 43 Wash. 2d 710, 715, 263 P.2d 956, 959 (1953); Perry v.
Perry, 31 Wash. App. 604, 606, 644 P.2d 142, 144 (1982). See generally Comment, A
Damages Remedy for Abuses by Child Protection Workers, 90 YALE L.J. 681, 682-85
(1981) (general overview of state approaches to child protection).
[Vol. 14:383
1991] Babcock v. State 391
regarding the care of the child.' If a dependency has been
established and the state becomes the legal custodian of the
child, the state controls the placement of the child51 and deter-
mines the steps that a parent must follow to regain custody. 52
Establishing a dependency involves three stages: initial
investigation, fact-finding investigation, and disposition investi-
gation." At each stage, the DSHS caseworker investigates the
level of risk to the child and makes recommendations to the
court. The court will then determine whether the parent or an
agency such as DSHS will retain custody of the child based on
those recommendations. If the court awards custody to DSHS,
DSHS controls any specific foster-care placement and, in cer-
tain situations, DSHS may make a foster-care placement even
before a dependency has been ordered by the court.
At the initial stage, DSHS receives a report that a child
has been abused, neglected, or abandoned.54 To determine
what action should be taken, an intake worker at DSHS will
evaluate the risk to the child and consider whether previous
reports have been made.' Depending on the level of risk,
50. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 74.13.020 (1989), 74.13.031(3) (1989 & Supp. 1990); In
re Feldman, 94 Wash. 2d 244, 246, 615 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1980).
51. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.130(1)(b), 74.13.031(6).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(2).
53. Confusion commonly occurs over the nomenclature because the courts
sometimes refer to a factfinding hearing as a dependency hearing and sometimes refer
to both the factfinding hearing and the disposition hearing as a single dependency
hearing. Technically, the factfinding hearing and the disposition hearing are held
separately, although the disposition hearing is usually held immediately after the
factfinding hearing. See generally H. LANDAU, M. SALUS, T. STIFFMAN & N. KALB,
CHILD PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 19-26 (1980).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(3) (1989); WASH. ADMiiI. CODE § 388-15-132
(1989). DSHS has a statutory duty to
[i]nvestigate complaints of neglect, abuse, or abandonment of children, and on
the basis of the findings of such investigation, offer child welfare services in
relation to the problem to such parents, legal custodians, or persons serving in
loco parentis, and/or bring the situation to the attention of an appropriate
court, or another community agency....
WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(3). DSHS has a duty to see to the welfare of dependent
children. See In Re Feldman, 94 Wash. 2d 244, 246-47, 615 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1980).
Because of the concern about child abuse, the legislature has also mandated that
any person who participated in a good faith report of alleged child abuse or testified to
the alleged abuse in a judicial proceeding is immune from liability arising out of such
reporting or testimony under any state law. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060 (1989).
DSHS receives and investigates child abuse reports through its subdivision, Child Pro-
tective Services. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 388-15-130 to -132 (1989).
55. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132 (1989). The intake worker evaluates the risk
by recording the responses of the informant on a risk matrix. See DrvIsION OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERvIcEs, WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH
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DSHS may take no action and simply file the report.'
However, if the risk to the child is sufficient, DSHS may
decide to monitor the child in the parental home or to remove
the child from the home and place the child in shelter care. 7
Shelter care is only a temporary placement in a facility
licensed by DSHS, such as a foster home, or a facility not
required to be licensed, such as the home of a relative.' The
decision to place a child in shelter care may be made without a
court order if the officer has reason to believe that the child is
at risk of immediate harm.59 However, the officer must obtain
a court order if the child is to remain in shelter care.' If a
hearing is held, the court will determine whether the child
may be returned to the parental home and whether a depen-
dency petition should be filed.61 Furthermore, whether or not
the child is removed from the home, DSHS may file a depen-
dency petition which would enable the agency to assume con-
trol of the child.62
If the DSHS caseworker determines that a dependency
should be established and files a dependency petition, the
caseworker will initiate an investigation which will lead to a
fact-finding hearing.' The fact-finding hearing is a full evi-
dentiary hearing in which the state has the burden of proving
that the child meets certain statutory requirements for depen-
SERVICES, RISK ASSESSMENT IN CHILD PROTECTION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE,
(1987).
56. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(1)(b). DSHS has the authority to refuse
to investigate the reported abuse or neglect. Id.
57. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(5). WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.060 (1989)
mandates that children removed from the home by law enforcement officers or Child
Protective Services be placed in shelter care.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.060.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.050 (1989).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.060. The statute provides that
[n]o child may be held longer than seventy-two hours, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays, after such child is taken into custody unless a court
order has been entered for continued shelter care. The child and his or her
parent, guardian, or custodian shall be informed that they have a right to a
shelter care hearing. The court shall hold a shelter care hearing if one is
requested.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.060. If the parent requests that the hearing be held,
the court will hold the hearing and determine whether the child can be returned to
the home or whether the child should remain in shelter care. Id. DSHS may
recommend that the shelter care be continued if DSHS files a petition alleging
dependency. Id.
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.040 (1989).
63. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.120 (1989). The factfinding hearing must be held
with 45 days of the filing of a dependency petition. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 3.4(c).
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dency status.64 If the court orders that a dependency be estab-
lished, the court will then require a disposition hearing, which
is usually held immediately after the fact-finding hearing.'
At the disposition hearing, the court determines where the
dependent child will be placed.' At this hearing, DSHS must
submit its disposition recommendation in the form of a social
study. 7  Because the court generally relies upon the
caseworker's judgment regarding placement rather than con-
ducting its own independent investigation, the report from
DSHS has a tremendous influence over the court's placement
decision.'
At the disposition hearing, the court may order that the
dependent child remain in the parental home or be placed
outside the home." If the court determines that the child can-
not remain in the parental home, the court has several place-
ment options. 70  Although the legislative preference is
64. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.110 (1989). A child may be found
dependent upon the care of the state if the child has been abandoned, neglected, or
abused, or if the child lacks a parent or guardian able to adequately care for the child.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030(2).
The need to establish a dependency must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130.
65. See WASH. Juv. CT. R. 3.8(a).
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130, WASH. Juv. CT. R 3.8.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.120(1). The statute states:
[t]o aid the court in its decision on disposition, a social study, consisting of a
written evaluation of matters relevant to the disposition of the case, shall be
made by the person or agency filing the petition. The study shall include all
social records and may also include facts relating to the child's cultural
heritage, and shall be made available to the court. The court shall consider
the social file and social study at the disposition hearing in addition to
evidence produced at the fact-finding hearing. At least ten working days prior
to the disposition hearing, the department shall mail to the parent and his or
her attorney a copy of the agency's social study and proposed service plan,
which shall be in writing or in a form understandable to the parents or
custodians.
Id.
68. See Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 111, 768 P.2d 481, 496 (1989) (Utter, J.,
dissenting).
69. WASH. REV CODE § 13.34.130(1).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1)(b). The statute provides:
The court shall order one of the following dispositions of the case:
(a) Order a disposition other than removal of the child from his or her
home, which shall provide a program designed to alleviate the immediate
danger to the child, to mitigate or cure any damage the child has already
suffered, and to aid the parents so that the child will not be endangered in the
future. In selecting a program, the court should choose those services that
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placement with a relative,7 the court often orders that the
child be placed with DSHS, which has the authority to accept
legal custody of dependent children.72 The transfer of legal
custody charges the custodian, DSHS, with the following
duties: (1) maintaining physical custody of the child; (2) protec-
tion, training, and discipline of the child; and (3) providing
food, clothing, shelter, education, and routine medical care.73
Additionally, DSHS must provide a specific plan for the child's
placement.74
If DSHS must accept custody, it will usually place the
child in foster-care while retaining legal custody.75  The two
least interfere with family autonomy, provided that the services are adequate
to protect the child.
(b) Order that the child be removed from his or her home and ordered
into the custody, control, and care of a relative or the department of social and
health services or a licensed child placing agency for placement in a foster
family home or group care facility licensed pursuant to chapter 74.15 RCW or
in a home not required to be licensed pursuant to chapter 74.15 RCW. Unless
there is reasonable cause to believe that the safety or welfare of the child
would be jeopardized or that the efforts to reunite the parent and child will be
hindered, such child will be placed with a grandparent, brother, sister,
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, or first cousin with whom the child has a
relationship and is comfortable, and who is willing and available to care for
the child. An order for out-of-home placement may be made only if the court
finds that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal of the child from the child's home and to make it possible for the
child to return home.., and that:
(i) There is no parent or guardian available to care for such child;
(ii) The child is unwilling to reside in the custody of the child's parent,
guardian, or legal custodian;
(iii) The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is not willing to take
custody of the child; [or]
(iv) A manifest danger exists that the child will suffer serious abuse or
neglect if the child is not removed from the home and an order under RCW
26.44.063 would not protect the child from danger ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1).
71. See id The relative placement may be arranged by DSHS. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 388-15-130(4)(b)(ii) (1989). However, a relative placement does not presently
require the same kind of licensing investigation that a foster-care placement entails.
See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-064(5) (1989).
72. WAH. REv. CODE § 74.13.031(6). When the disposition requires that the child
be removed from the parental home, it has the effect of transferring legal custody to
the agency or custodian charged with the child's care. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 3.8(e).
73. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 3.8(e).
74. WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.130(2).
75. See Comment, supra note 49, at 684 n.22 ("[floster placement in a private
family is the most frequent choice in the majority of jurisdictions"). Even though the
child is placed in foster-care, DSHS remains the legal custodian. The foster-parent
does not have a legal interest in the child. See In Re Baby Girl Coverdell, 30 Wash.
App. 677, 637 P.2d 991 (1981) (foster-parent had no right to intervene in dependency
proceedings).
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basic principles that underlie foster-care are that the child is
placed on a temporary basis with the foster family and that
DSHS reserves the right to remove the child at any time from
the foster home.76 Foster care is intended to serve as a substi-
tute to parental care until the child can be returned to the
parental home or until another permanent placement can be
made.77 In addition to its initial duty to investigate foster
homes for licensing purposes, DSHS has a continuing duty to
monitor the dependent child in the foster home.78
To clarify, the factfinding hearing, in which the child may
be determined to be dependent, and the disposition hearing, in
which the legal custody of the child is determined, are two
phases of what is collectively referred to as a dependency pro-
ceeding. By contrast, the placement in foster care takes place
subsequent to the dependency proceeding, after the court has
ordered custody to DSHS.79 The issue at the fact-finding hear-
ing is the parent's ability to care for the child.8° If the court
finds sufficient evidence that the child is dependent, then the
dependency is established at the fact-finding hearing.8' The
initial issue at the disposition is whether the child can remain
in the parental home, even if monitored." If the court orders
that the child be removed from the parental home and places
the child with DSHS, DSHS becomes responsible for the care,
custody, and control of the child. 3 At that point, DSHS,
rather than the natural parent, has assumed care of the child
as if DSHS were the parent.84 Because the court itself does not
order specific foster-care placement in the disposition order,
76. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 24 (2d ed. 1979); J. WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY 313 (1979).
77. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-150 (1989).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031(5); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-012(h) (1989).
79. In limited cases, foster-care placement may be made prior to the order of
dependency. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.44.050, 13.34.060 (allowing placement of a child in
emergency shelter care).
80. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.34.030, -.130.
81. See WASH. REV CODE § 13.34.130.
82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(I)(a).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1)(b).
84. See Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407
P.2d 440 (1965). The care, custody, and discipline of wards of the state shall
approximate that which should be given by the parent. Id. at 259-60, 407 P.2d at 447.
In Evangelical, a juvenile in the custody of the state burned down a church and
residence. The owners sued the state for negligently supervising the juvenile whom
the state knew to be a pyromaniac. The court determined that the state was like a
parent to the juvenile and owed a duty to the community commensurate with the duty
of a parent in similar circumstances. Id. at 260, 407 P.2d at 447-48.
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DSHS then selects the foster home in which the child will be
placed.8
C Facts of Babcock v. State
In Babcock v. State," the Washington Supreme Court
addressed the issue of dependent children who had been placed
at risk in foster-care. In Babcock, the father of children who
had been sexually abused by a foster parent brought suit on
behalf of himself and the children against the state and the
individual caseworkers for negligence, outrage, and alienation
of affections.87 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants." The Washington Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the individual defendants and the state
were absolutely immune from negligence liability.89
Rudolph Babcock and Ann Long had two daughters, Erika
and Beth; in addition, Ann had two daughters from a previous
marriage, Angela and Aryn Long. On August 28, 1978, Ann
Long Babcock committed suicide.' After her death, Rudolph
was apparently unable to care for the girls, and in August 1981,
a Louisiana court ordered placement of the girls with
Rudolph's parents, Willis and Elizabeth Babcock.9 Because
the elder Babcocks lived in Richland, Washington, the court
ordered the transfer of the case to Washington. 2
Subsequently, on March 31, 1982, a dependency disposition
hearing was held,9' in which Rudolph was represented by
counsel. The juvenile court granted a continuance as to the
Babcock girls, who had been removed by their father from the
state, and granted a temporary order that the Long girls be
placed with Lee and Janet Michael.94 Upon their return to the
85. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1) Cf N. O'NEILL, THE DIVISION OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES LEGAL REFERENCE BOOK, app. 2, 19 (1984)
(containing sample disposition order).
86. 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989).
87. Id. The claims for outrage and alienation of affections were dismissed on
summary judgment with the negligence claim. Id. This Note will deal only with the
issues raised by the dismissal of the negligence claim.
88. Id. at 92, 768 P.2d at 486.
89. Id. at 108, 768 P. 2d at 494.
90. Id. at 85, 768 P.2d at 483.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court ordered the transfer pursuant to the interstate compact on the
placement of children. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.34.
93. The disposition hearing was held pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.110.
94. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 86, 768 P.2d at 483. Janet Long was the natural aunt
of the girls. It is not clear whether the children were placed with the Michaels as a
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state and prior to the issuance of a court order, the Babcock
girls were also placed in the Michaels' home.9'
On May 4, 1982, a second disposition hearing was held.
Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.120, DSHS submitted a
report and recommendation for placement to the court. The
report, written by DSHS caseworker Wanda Tyler, recom-
mended that all four girls be placed in the care of the
Michaels. Rudolph Babcock was present at the hearing and
objected to the recommendation of DSHS on the grounds that
the Michaels had interfered with his relationship with the
girls, hampering reunification. 6 The court continued the pro-
ceeding until more evidence became available.9
On August 26 and 27, 1982, a third disposition hearing was
held. Mark Bronson, the DSHS caseworker who had replaced
Tyler, testified that, based on the report previously prepared
by Tyler, the Michaels should be made guardians of the Long
girls and the Babcock girls should remain in the Michaels'
home. Janet and Lee Michael also testified regarding their
relationships with the girls. All of the witnesses were cross-
examined by counsel for Rudolph and Rudolph testified on his
own behalf. Ultimately, the juvenile court ordered that all
four girls should remain with the Michaels.9"
relative placement or whether the Michaels were licensed as a foster-care placement
facility. The court referred to the Michaels as foster parents but did not mention
whether the Michaels were licensed. The initial DSHS caseworker, Wanda Tyler, also
testified at a deposition that she evaluated the Michaels as foster parents, rather than
as adoptive parents. Id. at 91, 768 P.2d at 486. In fact, only one visit was made to the
Michaels' home and Tyler compiled information regarding the Michaels on an
adoption application form. Id. at 110, 768 P.2d at 495 (Utter, J., dissenting). Tyler
prepared the home study for the court on the basis of that one visit. Id.
Currently, the requirements for foster-care licensing are more stringent than
relative placement and would have entitled the Michaels to payment for the girls' care.
In either situation, DSHS would still be responsible for investigating the placement.
However, in a relative placement, the relative becomes the legal custodian at the close
of the disposition. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1)(b). For purposes of analysis,
however, this Note considers the Michaels as foster-parents because the rule created
by the court applies equally to foster-parent relationships.
95. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1989).
96. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 110-11, 768 P.2d at 496 (Utter, J., dissenting). DSHS
operates under a legislative mandate to reunify the family unless reunification
jeopardizes the health or safety of the child. See generally WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.020.
97. The court continued the proceeding to await the receipt of the dependency
records from Louisiana. 112 Wash. 2d at 87, 768 P.2d at 484.
98. Id. at 87-88, 768 P.2d at 484-85. Again, it was unclear whether the court
specifically ordered placement with the Michaels because they were relatives or
whether DSHS retained legal custody but placed the girls with the Michaels as foster
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The Long and the Babcock girls remained in the Michaels'
home until October 1983, when it was discovered that Lee
Michael had been sexually abusing all four girls, in addition to
his own daughter.9 At the time the Michaels were awarded
custody of the four girls, Lee Michael had a substantial crimi-
nal record, which included charges of forcible rape, attempted
rape, and sexual assault."°
DSHS based its recommendation that the girls be placed
with the Michaels on a single home study conducted by Tyler
in November 1981. Tyler testified at her deposition that,
although the Michaels were evaluated as foster parents and
not adoptive parents, she used a form entitled "Adoption
Application." By failing to ask the question contained in the
form concerning the applicant's criminal history, Tyler failed
to discover Lee Michael's criminal record.11' In addition, Tyler
conducted no other investigation that would have revealed his
record. At that time, DSHS did not require a check of police
records.'0 2 DSHS did admit, however, that had it discovered
the criminal record, it would not have recommended place-
ment of the girls in the Michaels' home.'03
parents. The court referred to the placement with the Michaels as a "foster
placement." Id. at 84, 768 P.2d at 483. Ordinarily, the foster-parents are not named in
the disposition order. C. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1)(b) (court orders child into
custody of DSHS, who will then determine the placement).
99. 112 Wash. 2d at 90, 768 P.2d at 486. Lee Michael was subsequently convicted
on three counts of statutory rape and two counts of indecent liberties. He is presently
serving a 55-year sentence. Id. at 90-91, 768 P.2d at 486.
100. Id. at 91, 768 P.2d at 486.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 110, 768 P.2d at 495 (Utter, J., dissenting).
103. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 110, 768 P.2d at 486.
The plaintiffs also brought suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the individual caseworkers, Tyler and Bronson. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497
(9th Cir. 1989). In February 1986, the defendants filed a motion in the district court to
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground of absolute immunity. The district
court denied the motion. 884 F.2d at 500. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided two cases involving DSHS proceedings and which granted absolute
immunity to the caseworkers involved. Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social
Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.) cert denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987); Coverdell v. Dep't of
Social and Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1987). Both of the cases involved the
initiation of child dependency proceedings.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they were entitled
to absolute immunity under Meyers and Coverdell. Nevertheless, on January 11, 1988,
the district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and refused to
dismiss the case on the ground of absolute immunity. Babcock, 884 F.2d at 500. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the district court's denial and issued
instructions to dismiss the suit. The court held that the caseworkers were entitled to
absolute immunity. Id. at 504.
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D. The Court's Analysis: Extending the Scope of Judicial
Immunity
The Washington Supreme Court' held that the individ-
ual DSHS caseworkers and the state were entitled to absolute
immunity from liability for negligence on the ground that the
acts occurred in the course of a judicial proceeding required by
statute. 0 5 The court first characterized the dependency hear-
ings as "adversarial judicial proceedings"'0 and then deter-
mined that the participants were "entitled to absolute
immunity as a safeguard on the integrity of such proceed-
ings. ''P1 7 According to the court, the scope of this immunity
extended to all participants in the judicial proceeding and
included out-of-court investigations. °
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the common
law doctrine of judicial immunity.1 9 The cases upon which the
court relied granted immunity based on the functional com-
parability of the role being considered to that of a judge, the
role to which courts traditionally applied immunity.1 0 The
Babcock court interpreted these cases as setting forth a single
theory of judicial immunity: that participants in a judicial pro-
ceeding are immune from suit."' The court reasoned that
104. Justice Dore writing for the court, with Chief Justice Callow and Justice
Durham concurring, Justices Dolliver and Andersen concur in the result; Justice Utter
writing the dissent, with Justices Brachtenbach and Pearson concurring.
105. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 94, 768 P.2d at 487-88. WAsH. REV. CODE § 13.34.110
requires a hearing for the disposition of a dependent child.
106. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 95, 768 P.2d at 488.
107. Id. The court first found that the individual defendants were absolutely
immune and, through an agency theory, that the state was immune to the same extent
as the caseworkers. I&r at 105, 768 P.2d at 493.
108. Id.
109. The Washington Supreme Court cited Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); and Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
110. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423, n.20. See supra notes 18-47 and accompanying text.
111. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 95, 768 P.2d at 488. The defendants had only
contended that the cases established two separate grounds of immunity: quasi-
prosecutorial immunity, in which the caseworker's role was analogous to a prosecutor,
and witness immunity. Id. at 98, 768 P.2d at 489. However, the court did not
distinguish between the cases. Instead the court stated that "[t]he leading cases
actually set forth a single theory of immunity: that participants in adversarial judicial
proceedings are immune from suit as a safeguard on the integrity of the adversarial
process itself." Id. at 98, 768 P.2d at 489. See also Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs.
Eng'rs., Inc., 113 Wash. 2d 123, 776 P.2d 666 (1989). Granting absolute immunity to
expert witnesses, the Bruce court reasoned as follows:
The purpose of granting immunity for participants in judicial proceedings is to
preserve and enhance the judicial process . . . . The various grants of
immunity for judges and witnesses, as well as for prosecutors and bailiffs, are
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immunity was needed to protect the truth-seeking function of
the court.112 According to the court, the threat of liability
would have a chilling effect on the investigation and prosecu-
tion of cases and would restrict the free flow of information." 3
Finally, the court also expressed the concern that the threat of
liability might distract the prosecutor from the businesss of his
office and that, as a matter of efficiency, to allow a civil suit
might require a retrial of the criminal case." 4
Although the Babcock court never expressly mentioned
"functional comparability," it purported to rely upon Imbler v.
Pachtman115 and Butz v. Economou" 6 in its analysis." 7 Both
Imbler and Butz limited judicial immunity to acts functionally
comparable to the judicial role."' The Babcock court, however,
went beyond the holdings in Imbler and Butz by extending
immunity to all participants in the proceeding, covering both
their in-court and out-of-court conduct, without a strict analy-
sis of the nexus between the act and the judicial function
served."9 In an attempt to justify this approach, the Babcock
court interpreted the Imbler Court's grant of immunity as
based on the nature of the proceedings rather than on the
nature of the individual's duties. 120 In other words, the Bab-
cock court focused on the procedural safeguards, the second
part of the Butz test, rather than on the specific conduct for
which the immunity was claimed. By focusing on the proce-
dural safeguards, the court found that the judicial function of
truth-seeking was adequately protected.l2 ' Thus, the court
held that immunity should be granted so that the participants
in the proceeding could carry out their functions without fear
all particular applications of this central policy. They are best described as
instances of a single immunity for participants in judicial proceedings.
Id. at 128, 776 P.2d at 668.
112. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 98, 768 P.2d at 489.
113. Id. at 98, 768 P.2d at 489-90.
114. Id. at 98, 768 P.2d at 489.
115. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
116. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
117. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 97, 768 P.2d at 489.
118. For discussion of functional comparability, see supra text accompanying notes
18-47.
119. See Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 104, 768 P.2d at 492 (refusing to consider a
distinction between the acts involved in establishing the dependency and the acts
involved in foster-care placement).
120. Id. at 99, 768 P.2d at 490.
121. Id. at 100, 768 P.2d at 490 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
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of intimidation or harassment. 122
After concluding that all participants in adversarial pro-
ceedings were entitled to absolute immunity, the court ana-
lyzed whether the dependency proceedings were adversarial in
nature.123 To make such a determination, the court examined
whether the parties had the opportunity to offer evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and argue to the court. 2 4 The court
noted that the report by DSHS must be admissible under the
rules of evidence, 25 that the parents of dependent children
have access to the caseworker's report and recommendation, 26
and that counsel for Rudolph Babcock cross-examined Bron-
122. Id. Additionally, the Babcock court referred to the immunity of witnesses in
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). See Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 100, 768 P.2d at
491. In Briscoe, convicted state defendants brought a civil rights action against police
officers because of the alleged perjured testimony of the officers at the defendants'
criminal trial. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 327. The police officers in Briscoe were held
absolutely immune for their testimony as witnesses in the course of a judicial
proceeding. However, the police officers were not entitled to absolute immunity in the
performance of their duties simply because they might testify later in a judicial
proceeding. The immunity was limited to freedom from civil liability for the
consequences of what the officers said in court. See id. at 342.
The Babcock court ignored this distinction and stressed the concern that witnesses
would be intimidated by the fear of liability, which would impair the truth-seeking
function. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 100-101, 768 P.2d at 672. The court recently
reiterated its adherence to the principle of absolute immunity for witnesses in Bruce v.
Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 113 Wash. 2d 123, 776 P.2d 666 (1989). In Bruce,
the court extended absolute immunity to expert witnesses for acts in preparation of
litigation. Id. at 136, 776 P.2d at 672. The court allowed the immunity to protect both
the witness' testimony and the basis of that testimony, such as reports prepared for use
in court even though the preparation may be negligent. Id. at 135, 776 P.2d at 672.
123. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 101-103, 768 P.2d at 491-92.
124. Id. at 101-102, 768 P.2d at 491.
125. Id. at 101, 768 P.2d at 491. The court cited to WASH. REv. CODE. § 13.34.110,
which reads in part "[n]o social file or social study may be considered by the court in
connection with the fact-finding or prior to factual determination, except as otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence." However, this portion of the statute applies
only to the fact-finding portion of a dependency hearing. It does not refer to the
disposition phase of a dependency hearing, which may immediately follow the fact-
finding portion of a dependency hearing. WASH. JUV. CT. R. 3.8(a). The rules of
evidence do not apply to a disposition hearing. For disposition hearings, or the
disposition phase of a dependency hearing, WASH. JUV. CT. R. 3.8(c) states:
Evidence. The court shall consider the social file, social study, and other
appropriate pre-disposition studies, in addition to information produced at the
fact-finding and disposition hearings. Any party shall have the right to be
heard at the disposition hearing. Any social file, social study, or pre-
disposition study shall be made available for inspection by a party or his or
her lawyer for a reasonable time prior to the disposition hearing.
See also O'NEILL, supra note 85, A-30, -31.
126. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 101, 768 P.2d at 491 (parent has access to report and
recommendation pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.110).
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son, the witness who presented the report to the court.' 7
Because all parties had the opportunity to offer evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and argue to the court, the court con-
cluded that the proceeding was fully adversarial. i 2' As a
result, the court concluded that the caseworkers were entitled
to absolute immunity.129
The court reiterated four policy reasons why absolute
immunity should be granted to caseworkers in the context of
dependency actions. First, the threat of civil suits would
inhibit caseworkers from initiating dependency actions.' 30 Sec-
ond, caseworkers should be protected as witnesses; otherwise,
they might withhold information critical to a proper resolution
of the case.1 3 ' Third, the adversarial nature of the proceeding,
including cross-examination and argument, is an adequate
check on the fairness and thoroughness of DSHS proce-
dures. 3 2 Finally, civil suits are redundant and expensive, and
the court should favor absolute immunity to protect the final-
ity of decisions and judicial efficiency. 1
After determining that caseworkers were entitled to abso-
lute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings,
the court extended the scope of the immunity to include the
caseworkers' actions outside the courtroom. 134  The court
found the threat of liability equally damaging to the adver-
sarial process whether liability is imposed for preparing the
report and recommendation or whether it is imposed for testi-
fying in court. 31 The court reasoned that the imposition of lia-
bility for either task would limit the supply of information to
the court.x36 Thus, the proceeding's objective of determining
the best interests of the children prohibited the juvenile court
from acting until fully appraised of all necessary
information. 37
In order to protect the flow of information, the Babcock
court expressly refused to distinguish between the
127. Id. at 101, 768 P.2d at 491.
128. Id. at 102, 768 P.2d at 491.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 102, 768 P.2d at 491-92.
132. Id. at 102, 768 P.2d at 492.
133. Id. at 103, 768 P.2d at 492.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 104, 768 P.2d at 492.
137. Id. at 103, 768 P.2d at 492.
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caseworker's actions in establishing a dependency and his or
her actions in placing the child in foster-care."3 Because the
caseworkers in the suit had not actually removed the children
from the parental home,' 39 the court stated that removal was
not at issue.14° Consequently, the court did not limit the
immunity to the removal.14 ' Instead, the court focused on the
caseworker's role in the adversarial proceeding, rather than
the particular actions to which immunity would apply. Ignor-
ing the distinction that other courts have made between the
particular duties involved in dependency proceedings and fos-
ter-care placement proceedings, 42 the Babcock court concluded
that the caseworker's full range of duties fall within the scope
of immunity. 1
4 3
138. Id. at 104, 768 P.2d at 492.
139. Id. at 85, 768 P.2d at 483 (Louisiana caseworkers had removed the children
from the family home).
140. Id. at 104, 768 P.2d at 492.
141. Id. at 104, 768 P.2d at 492-93. The court stated that
there is no basis for distinguishing between the removal and the placement of
the child. Both decisions are in the hands of the court, first in the factfinding
hearing and then in the hearing on disposition. As to both removal and
placement, [DSHS] functions in the same advisory role, preparing a single
report containing a single recommended plan of action. The need for
immunity based on the integrity of the adversarial proceeding is the same in
regard to both removal and placement.
Id.
142. See, e.g., Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977) (judge
who ordered placement in foster-care and prosecutor were both immune from liability
for child's death at hands of foster-parent, but welfare department charged with
custody of the child for placement in foster-care could be liable); compare Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 109 (1989) (state may owe
constitutional duty of protection to children in its custody, although such a duty is not
owed to children in parental home).
143. Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d at 104, 768 P.2d at 492-93. Similarly, the
federal court considered the integral nature of the caseworker's actions in the
disposition to the whole dependency proceeding. See Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497,
503 (9th Cir. 1989). The test the federal court applied was whether the action for
which the immunity was claimed was so integral to the judicial process that to deny
immunity would not serve the public interest in having participants in judicial
proceedings perform their function without fear of having to defend their actions in a
civil lawsuit. Id. at 502.
Applying this test, the federal court first noted that it had extended absolute
prosecutorial immunity to caseworkers who initiated and pursued dependency
proceedings, Babcock, 884 F.2d at 502 (citing Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of
Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987)), and who sought
and obtained a court order for the seizure and placement of a newborn child. Id. at 502
(citing Coverdell v. Dep't of Social and Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 1987)
(the caseworker who executed the court order for seizure and placement was also
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). In Babcock v. Tyler, the federal court then
extended the scope of immunity to include post-adjudication activities in addition to
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E. The Court Overextended the Application of Judicial
Immunity
The Washington Supreme Court interpreted Imbler and
its progeny to extend the scope of judicial immunity not only
to participants' conduct within the courtroom but also to their
actions occurring outside the courtroom. This interpretation,
however, overextended the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Imbler. The Babcock court asserted that Imbler
"bases prosecutorial immunity on the nature of the criminal
proceeding; not on the nature of the prosecutor's duties."'"
However, a closer reading of Imbler reveals that the Imbler
Court based immunity for prosecutors on the "functional com-
parability" of decisions of prosecutors to the decisions of
judges. 14 Contrary to the Babcock court's interpretation, the
Imbler Court did not grant blanket immunity to individuals
simply because they were participants in a judicial proceeding.
Only some actions were protected. For example, the Imbler
Court did not extend absolute immunity to those aspects of the
prosecutor's duties that were administrative or investigative."
The prosecutor received absolute immunity only for those
actions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.' 47  However, a prosecutor will not receive
absolute immunity when acting outside the scope of litigation-
the acts by which the dependency is initiated because it considered the dependency to
be a single action. Babcock, 884 F.2d at 503. The federal court's rationale for this
extension was that "[t]he fear of financially devastating litigation would compromise
caseworkers' judgment during this phase of the proceedings and would deprive the
court of information it needs to make an informed decision." Id. at 497. The federal
court refused to distinguish between actions during the judicial proceeding and
services performed outside the court in monitoring child placement. Id. at 503. Thus,
the federal court determined that all of the caseworkers' actions made pursuant to a
dependency proceeding were entitled to absolute judicial immunity because their
participation in the court proceedings was an integral part of the judicial process. Id.
at 502.
The Washington Supreme Court also held that the state was not liable because the
caseworkers' defense of absolute immunity was not a personal one, but rather related
to their role as agents of the state. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 105, 768 P.2d at 493.
Consequently, since the caseworkers were entitled to a defense of absolute immunity,
that defense would be imputed to their employer, the state. Id. at 106, 768 P.2d at 493.
144. Id. at 99, 768 P.2d at 490 [emphasis in original]. However, the court did not
consider which duties were protected by absolute immunity.
145. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
146. Id. at 430.
147. Id. at 430. See also Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-72 (2nd Cir.
1986) (prosecutorial protection encompasses "all of their activities that can be fairly
characterized as closely associated with the conduct of litigation or potential litigation
...')
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related duties.1
F The Application of the Functional Comparability Test to
Foster-Care Placement
Instead of over-extending the application of judicial immu-
nity under Imbler, the Babcock court should have adhered to
the functional comparability test developed by the United
States Supreme Court in Butz. Under this test, the
caseworker's actions in investigating the foster-care placement
would not be granted absolute immunity because the actions
do not meet the requirements of analogous duties and institu-
tional controls. In Butz, the court first looked for duties analo-
gous to those performed by officials already protected by
absolute immunity. 149 By examining the differences between
the caseworker's duties during the establishment of the depen-
dency and during the foster-care placement, the Babcock court
could have distinguished the actions that were comparable to
the immunized actions of a prosecutor from the actions that
are not traditionally protected by immunity.
Applying the Butz analysis of analogous duties, the initia-
tion of a dependency proceeding could be analogized to the ini-
tiation of a criminal charge. Like a prosecutor assessing
whether a crime has been committed and whether the ele-
ments of the crime can be proven, the caseworker must assess
whether the child is at risk of harm and whether the
caseworker will have sufficient proof to establish the depen-
dency. Initially, the caseworker has a duty to investigate the
parental home.'5° This investigation may culminate in a
dependency proceeding during which the court determines
whether there are grounds for DSHS to assume the parental
duties. This often results in the removal of the child from the
parental home. However, like a prosecutor who may decide to
plea bargain or dismiss a case, the caseworker may decide to
reach another resolution. The caseworker may decide not to
file a dependency petition but to continue working with the
148. Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2nd Cir. 1987); accord Imbler, 424 U.S. at
430. Thus, a prosecutor might not be protected from liability when the prosecutor
authorizes the use of wiretaps, Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2nd Cir. 1984), or
assists in the execution of a search and seizure, Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 918-19
(2nd Cir. 1987).
149. See Note, supra note 28, at 402.
150. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(3) (1989).
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family. 15 1 The caseworker may even decide that the risk is
insufficient to investigate 152 or that the risk has diminished
and close the case.'"
During the establishment of the dependency, like the
criminal context, investigation and efficient resolution should
be encouraged. Even if no grounds for a conviction or depen-
dency are discovered during the investigation, it is better to
allow investigations that might apprehend criminals or protect
children rather than to inhibit such investigation. The
caseworker should have absolute immunity for the initiation of
dependencies because of the similarities in the caseworker's
duties to those of the prosecutor which are are protected under
Imbler.
By contrast, when the caseworker makes a foster-care
placement, the caseworker has moved away from the quasi-
judicial function of initiating and proving a dependency.
Instead, the caseworker performs the ministerial act of investi-
gating and supervising the placement of the child who, theoret-
ically, has been removed from the risk of harm. Once the
court has ordered the dependent child into the custody of
DSHS at the disposition hearing, the court is not required to
order specific foster-care placement." 4 That decision remains
with the custodial agency, DSHS. DSHS has the duty to inves-
tigate potential foster homes' and to monitor foster-care
placements." The caseworker must evaluate the needs of the
dependent child'5 7 and determine which foster-care placement
best meets those needs' l s
While these duties differ from those of a prosecutor, the
roles of each subsequent to the judicial proceeding are analo-
gous when considered in light of the characteristics tradition-
ally supporting a grant of judicial immunity. Thus, once the
proceeding has been completed, neither the prosecutor nor the
caseworker occupies a role or engages in conduct to which
courts have traditionally extended immunity. After the con-
viction and sentencing, the prosecutor is no longer involved in
151. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(5)(a).
152. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(1)(b).
153. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-15-132(5)(c).
154. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130.
155. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-73-036.
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031; WAH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-012(2)(h).
157. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-012(2)(e).
158. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-70-012(2)(f).
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the criminal case. Instead, the state assumes custody of con-
victed defendants sentenced to incarceration. Once the state
assumes custody, the state has a duty to assume responsibility
for the prisoner's welfare and safety." 9 At this point, the judi-
cial phase is over and judicial immunity does not apply.
Similarly, the Babcock court should have distinguished the
caseworker's duties in establishing a dependency from those in
making a foster-care placement in order to determine which
duties were analogous to those for which a prosecutor receives
absolute immunity. By doing so, the court could have limited
the application of immunity to the acts involved in the estab-
lishment of the dependency, acts integrally associated with the
judicial process. However, once the dependency is established,
the caseworker's actions cease to be analogous to those for
which a prosecutor receives immunity because the judicial
phase has ceased. At this point, the judicial truth-seeking
function is no longer present.
The truth-seeking function of the court is not at risk if lia-
bility can attach to foster-care placement. At the dependency
proceeding, a caseworker may testify as to whether the natural
parents are able to care for the child. Caseworkers are granted
absolute immunity during this proceeding because, absent such
immunity, caseworkers might withhold potentially damaging
information about the parents for fear of a retaliatory suit.
At the disposition hearing, the caseworker's testimony
concerns whether the child should remain in the parental
home."6 If the court orders the child removed from the home
and grants custody to DSHS, the issue of the specific foster-
care placement will not arise. The natural parent may contest
the removal from the home but usually does not contest the
specific foster-care placement.16  Consequently, information
159. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989); see also Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (state owes
"unquestioned duty" to provide for safety of inmates in state mental institution); see
generally Mushlin, Unsafe Havenx The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199 (1988) (examining
the constitutional right to safety in state custody).
160. The main issue at the disposition hearing is whether the dependent child
should remain in the parental home. In-home placement is favored even when a
dependency has been established. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(1)(a) (1989).
161. See Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 768 P.2d 481 (1989). At each of the
disposition hearings, Rudolph Babcock sought to establish his ability to care for his
children. He was repeatedly denied custody because he had not established a
permanent home.
In Babcock, the background of the foster parents was not the central issue at the
1991]
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regarding the specific foster-care placement is irrelevant and
the truth-seeking function of the court is not at risk if the
caseworker is liable for that placement. Therefore, because of
the lack of analogous duties and the absence of the judicial
truth-seeking function, the application of judicial immunity
would fail the first part of the functional comparability test
applied in Butz.
In addition to the lack of analogous duties, the institu-
tional controls emphasized in Butz, chiefly cross-examination,
offers of evidence, and the penalty of perjury, are not suffi-
ciently present during foster-care placement. Because the
issue at the disposition hearing is not the specific foster-care
placement, the foster parents usually do not testify; conse-
quently, they are not subject to cross-examination or penalty
of perjury.162
Once the court enters the disposition order granting tem-
porary custody to DSHS, the judicial proceeding is over. DSHS
makes a specific foster-care placement after the judicial pro-
ceeding has ended."e At the time the court orders the disposi-
tion, it will not decide the specific foster-home in which the
children will be placed. Instead, the court relies on the
caseworker to investigate the foster home to determine if the
placement is appropriate.'6 As a result, the court will not
question the caseworker's investigation of the foster-care
disposition hearings. The case was unusual in the respect that Rudolph only
challenged the placement with the Michaels on the basis that the they interfered with
his attempts to reunify with his children. Id. at 86, 768 P.2d at 484. The Michaels'
ability to care for the children was not at issue. The main issue, rather, was whether
Rudolph Babcock had established a stable home for the children. In fact, when it
denied the state's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata, the court admitted
that the issues at the disposition hearings were not the same as the issue of negligent
placement. Id. at 94, 768 P.2d at 487.
162. In Babcock, because the foster-care placement was challenged, some of the
institutional controls were present. However, while a caseworker did testify as a
witness at the trial, the caseworker who made the report on which the testimony was
based was not subject to cross-examination and penalty of perjury. Id. at 97, 768 P.2d
at 489.
163. If the child was taken into shelter care prior to the dependency, then the
child may be placed in shelter care before the judicial proceeding. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.44.050, 13.34.060. Thus, the child can be at risk even before the issue of
foster-care placement arises. See Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 110-11, 768 P.2d at 496
(Utter, J., dissenting) (the children were in the Michaels' home before the court
ordered placement).
164. The court will continue to review whether the dependency should be
continued every six months. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(4). At the review hearings,
the court considers whether the parent and DSHS have completed the reunification
plan ordered by the court at the disposition. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.130(4).
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placement during the disposition. In Babcock, the court was
mistaken in its belief that both the establishment of the depen-
dency and the foster-care placement are in the hands of the
court.' Because of this mistake, the court also failed to recog-
nize that the safeguards present in a judicial proceeding will
not protect against dangers that are not at issue.
More importantly, the caseworker making the investiga-
tion has the best access to information concerning foster-care
placement. As in Babcock, the natural parent is often at odds
with the foster parent and lacks access to information about
the foster home." The natural parent, as well as the depen-
dent child, relies on the caseworker to fully investigate the
home. If the caseworker negligently fails to discover a harm-
ful situation, the institutional controls of cross-examination
and threat of perjury will not expose information of which the
caseworker is simply unaware.
Moreover, the Babcock court ignored the issue that, in
many cases, institutional controls are lacking because there is
no party available to challenge the removal from the parental
home. For example, when the child is abandoned or volunta-
rily relinquished, there will be no challenge to the disposition
and no inquiry into the foster-care placement. As a result,
extending judicial immunity to the post-disposition actions of
the caseworker will not be safeguarded by the institutional
controls of a judicial proceeding.
Because of the lack of analogous duties and institutional
controls, the caseworker's actions during foster-care placement
fail both parts of the functional comparability test outlined in
Butz. Accordingly, the Babcock court, by relying on well-rea-
soned decisions from other jurisdictions, should have refused
to extend the application of judicial immunity to foster-care
placement.
Based on the very cases upon which it relies for the appli-
cation of immunity, the Babcock court could have made a dis-
tinction between the caseworker's actions during the
establishment of a dependency and the caseworker's actions
during the foster-care placement. The cases upon which the
However, the caseworker continues to monitor the foster-care placement. WASH. REV.
CODE § 74.13.031(5).
165. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 104, 768 P.2d 484, 492 (1989).
166. Id. at 86, 768 P.2d at 484. In Babcock, the natural father only contended that
the foster parents interfered with his relationship with his daughters, thereby making
family reunification impossible. Id.
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court relied to state that caseworkers have been granted
immunity in the past are distinguishable on one basic fact:
they all involved a suit against a caseworker for initiating a
dependency investigation or proceeding.167 None of these cases
involved an injury to the child while in foster-care placement.
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the differences between
the initiation of dependency proceedings and foster-case place-
ment, have treated the two proceedings differently. When con-
fronted with an injury to a child in foster care, other courts
have found that the state has a duty to children in its care and,
consequently, may be liable for its negligence in placing and
supervising them.6's For example, in Koepf v. County of
167. Id. at 101, 768 P.2d at 491. The Washington Supreme Court cited Meyers v.
Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.) cert denied, 484
U.S. 829 (1987) (§ 1983 action for initiation of dependencies in which child was never
removed from the home and court refused to grant absolute immunity to all of the
caseworker's acts); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir. 1984) (action against
welfare department for initiation of dependency and termination of parental rights);
Hennessey v. State, 627 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (action against DSHS and
caseworkers for initiation of dependency proceedings); Whelehan v. County of Monroe,
558 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (action against welfare department for initiation of
child protection proceedings).
In Babcock, the children had already been declared dependent by the Louisiana
courts. The plaintiffs did not challenge that proceeding. Specifically, they charged
negligence once the girls were already in the care and custody of the state. The
situation was clearly distinguishable from the cases on which the plurality relied.
168. See Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970)
(investigation and supervision of foster-care placement by the welfare department was
a ministerial duty, which the court specifically distinguished from initiating a
dependency, and the department could be liable for negligence for breach of that
duty); Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977) (decisions of
welfare department in connection with foster care placement were ministerial and
immunity would not protect department from liability for negligent placement);
Bartels v. County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1980) (county could
be liable for injuries sustained by child at the hands of foster parent and county's duty
to supervise the care and welfare of the child could not be delegated to the foster
parent); National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982) (failure of
social workers to adequately investigate and supervise foster-care placement was
breach of ministerial duty and the social workers were not immune from suit); Little
v. State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) (failure of family services to
properly evaluate foster home, its failure to supervise the child's placement, and its
failure to protect the child from harm were breaches of ministerial duties and were
actionable negligence).
The dissent in Babcock cites to these cases. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 112, 768 P.2d
at 496 (Utter, J., dissenting). However, the plurality dismisses these cases as irrelevant
because it refuses to distinguish between initiation and placement, Id. at 104, 768 P.2d
at 492.
Recently, the Supreme Court indicated that foster-care placement should be
distinguished from initiating dependency proceedings. In Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Court held that the caseworkers
did not owe a constitutional duty to protect children by investigating child abuse
1991] Babcock v. State
York,'6 9 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
was entitled to absolute immunity under Imbler for initiating a
dependency action. However, the Koepf court held that once
the child was in the state's custody, the welfare department
had a duty to act with reasonable care and could be held liable
for breach of that duty."'
In Koepf, a mother brought an action for the wrongful
death of her minor child against the county, which managed
the child welfare department. The county had obtained a
court order declaring the child dependent and placing the child
in the custody of the welfare department. The county then
placed the child in a foster home. One month after the place-
ment, the child died of severe physical injuries inflicted by his
foster mother.'7 ' The child's natural mother then sued the
judge and the prosecutor alleging that they were negligent in
removing the child from her custody.'72 She also sued the
county welfare department, alleging that it had been negligent
in the selection of the foster parent.173
reports. However, the Court indicated that it might find that the caseworkers had a
constitutional duty to protect children that had been placed by the state in foster care:
[h]ad the State by affirmative exercise of its power removed [the child] from
free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might
have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration and institutionalization
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Indeed, several Courts of
Appeals have held, by analogy [to cases involving incarceration or
institutionalization], that the State may be held liable under the Due Process
Clause for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at
the hands of their foster parents.
Id. at 201, n.9. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2nd Cir.
1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782, cert. denied sub nom Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe,
464 U.S. 864 (1983); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989). See also Mushlin, supra note 159, at 226-27 (consid-
ering the constitutional right to safety beyond the actual institutional walls). The Con-
stitution may even protect those who, while not in state custody, are nevertheless
placed in danger by the state. Id. at 226 (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th
Cir. 1979)).
169. 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977).
170. Id. at 72-74, 251 N.W.2d at 870-71.
171. Id. at 69, 251 N.W.2d at 868.
172. Id. at 65, 251 N.W.2d at 868. The mother also sued the sheriff for negligently
removing the child from the parental home. Id. The court found that the sheriff was
immune from liability because he was an officer acting pursuant to a facially valid
order. Id.
173. Id. at 69, 251 N.W.2d at 869. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the
department was negligent because it had (1) not required that the foster-parent be
examined by a physician prior to placement, (2) not inquired into the foster-parent's
attitude regarding corporal punishment prior to placement, and (3) had placed the
child in the foster-home even though the department had received complaints about
the foster-parent. Id.
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The Nebraska court held that the judge was immune
because his actions occurred within his judicial capacity. 74
The court also granted the prosecutor "quasi-judicial" immu-
nity, reasoning that the prosecutor's acts, which occurred
within the general scope of his official capacity, must be per-
formed without fear of civil liability.175
On the other hand, the court refused to grant immunity to
the welfare department for the claim that it had negligently
placed the child in foster care. The court stated that the"placement in foster homes of defenseless children, and the
supervision of their health and care, once committed to the
custody of the welfare department must be accomplished with
reasonable care commensurate with the circumstances.' '1 76
While the court ultimately found for the defendant on the
issue of negligence, the court refused to protect the welfare
department under a strained immunity theory. 77 Instead, the
court distinguished the supervision of foster-care placement as
a ministerial act and determined that the welfare department
owed a duty of reasonable care to the children in its custody.171
Similarly, in Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department
of Social Services.,79 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
tinguished the acts for which a caseworker was entitled to judi-
cial immunity from the acts for which the caseworker was not
entitled to absolute immunity. The court determined that the
caseworker was entitled to absolute immunity, which the court
referred to as "prosecutorial immunity," for his role in the ini-
tiation of dependency proceedings.'8s The court determined
that the nature of the caseworker's action and the need for
caseworkers to perform without the fear of liability justified
the application of immunity to the caseworker's actions during
174. Id. at 70, 251 N.W.2d at 869.
175. Id. at 70-71, 251 N.W.2d at 869-70 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976)).
176. Id. at 73-74, 251 N.W.2d at 871. The Nebraska court also cited Elton v. County
of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970), in which the California court
noted that the decisions regarding placement, maintenance, care, or supervision of a
dependent child could give rise to a cause of action for negligence.
177. Koepf, 198 Neb. 67, 73-74, 251 N.W.2d 866, 870-71.
178. Id. at 73-74, 251 N.W.2d at 871.
179. 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987). In this case, the
children were never actually removed from the home, but rather the caseworker
ordered one parent to stay away from the home and initiated dependency proceedings,
which were later dismissed. Id. at 1156.
180. Id. at 1156.
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the initiation of the dependency proceeding."' 1
However, the court did not presume that all of the
caseworker's actions fell within the immunity. Specifically,
the court found that the caseworker's order that one parent
stay away from the home pending a judicial hearing could "be
characterized neither as advocatory or (sic) quasi-judicial."' 82
The court also found that the policy considerations supporting
quasi-judicial immunity did not apply to the caseworker's
action outside of the initiation of a dependency.8 3 Because the
caseworker's order that the parent stay away from the home
was outside of a judicial proceeding, therefore, it was not sub-
ject the institutional controls built into the judicial process.
Consequently, the court refused to extend the doctrine of judi-
cial immunity to those acts.'
Blinded by its concerns about caseworkers' liability, the
Babcock court missed the clear distinction between dependency
proceedings and foster-care placements. DSHS, through its
caseworkers, has a duty to investigate foster homes ade-
quately. 8 5 That duty should not be nullified by the application
of immunity because of the caseworker's involvement in judi-
cial proceedings to establish a dependency. Once a duty has
been imposed, the court can, and should, consider the volume
of the DSHS caseload in its determination of whether reason-
able care was taken. Also, the court would have to consider
whether the negligence proximately caused the injury. How-
ever, the issue should not be silenced on a contrivance of
immunity. If the Washington Supreme Court closely follows
the functional comparability test, examining both analogous
duties and institutional controls, it will be able to limit the
application of immunity to the initiation of dependency pro-
ceedings, and, thus, the state will be required to act cautiously
once it has assumed custody of a child.
181. Id. at 1157.
182. Id.
183. Id. "Nevertheless, the balance might not be struck in favor of absolute
immunity were it not for the presence of safeguards built into the judicial process that
tend to reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 1158 (quoting Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1300
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981)).
184. Id. at 1157. The court was willing, however, to grant the caseworker qualified
immunity because the acts occurred during the attempt to protect and promote the
welfare of a child by preventing a problem which might result in abuse or neglect. Id.
at 1158.
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.15.010 (1989).
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G. Legitimate Concerns Can Still Be Protected By the
Application Of Traditional Negligence Analysis
The Washington Supreme Court should consider an
approach that distinguishes acts involved in establishing a
dependency from acts involved in foster-care placement. Initi-
ation of dependencies should be facilitated so that children are
protected from risks to their safety and welfare; immunity
from civil liability for initiating dependencies encourages the
caseworker to begin investigations of the risks. However, once
the dependency is established, immunity for failure to investi-
gate the out-of-home placement does not facilitate the policy of
protecting the safety and welfare of children. Instead, it
removes an incentive to discover risks. Civil liability will deter
forms of negligence by encouraging due care and caution.18
As one commentator has noted, "[i]mmunity breeds negligence;
liability breeds caution."'1 7
The Babcock Court listed four policy reasons for granting
absolute immunity that would be served by removing the fear
of civil liability."" The policies include: (1) the prevention of
inhibition of initiating dependencies; (2) the prevention of the
possibility that caseworkers might withhold information; (3)
the existence of adequate safeguards provided by adversary
proceedings; and (4) the judicial interests served by preserving
the finality of judgments.'8 9 However, these policies would be
better served by the application of traditional negligence
analysis.
First, the Babcock court was concerned that the threat of
civil liability might inhibit caseworkers from initiating depen-
dency proceedings, thus leaving child abuse undeterred."°
That policy would, however, still be protected under a proper
186. Note, Governmental Immunity for the Child Care Social Worker: Has
Michigan Gone Too Far for Too Little?, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 763, (1988). "Perhaps the
best argument in favor of limited immunity for social workers is the deterrent effect of
liability." Id. at 780. The most effective deterrent is civil liability and the most
effective deterrent should be applied when foster-care workers place dependent
children at risk. However, because the spectre of liability may have too chilling an
effect on caseworker actions and employment, accountability still may be achieved
short of denying the injured child compensation. The state could indemnify its
employees, leaving them free to act but encouraging the state to train and supervise its
employees in order to avoid potential liability. Id. at 788-81.
187. Spader, Immunity v. Liability and the Clash of Fundamental Values:
Ancient Mysteries Crying Out for Understanding, 61 CHi-KENT L. REV. 61, 78 (1985).
188. Babcock v. State, 112 Wash. 2d 83, 102-103, 768 P.2d 481, 491-92 (1989).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 102, 768 P.2d at 491.
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application of Imbler and its progeny. Like the prosecutor in
Imbler, the caseworker's actions in initiating and pursuing
dependency proceedings would still be protected. Thus, those
actions would not be deterred by the threat of civil liability.
However, absolute immunity has not been granted when the
prosecutor performs investigative, ministerial, or administra-
tive functions. 191
Similarly, the caseworker should not be entitled to abso-
lute immunity when investigative, ministerial, or administra-
tive functions are performed. The actions during foster-care
placement are ministerial and thus are not entitled to absolute
immunity. Such ministerial actions must be performed with
reasonable care to adequately protect children under the
state's care. Therefore, once the dependency has been estab-
lished, the state should be liable for negligence in the care of a
dependent child. The court could still grant a limited immu-
nity to caseworkers for the initiation of dependencies; how-
ever, when foster care is involved, the court should apply a
negligence analysis.
Second, the Babcock court expressed concern that if not
protected as witnesses, caseworkers might withhold critical
information 192 or distort their testimony.193 Yet, in Babcock,
the problem was not that the caseworker withheld informa-
tion, it was that the caseworker never discovered information
critical to a proper resolution. Immunity would not promote
the discovery and disclosure of full information. On the other
hand, the threat of liability leads to more careful procedures in
placing dependent children because it creates an incentive to
discover information.194 Futhermore, under a standard of rea-
sonable care, liability would only attach to mistakes that could
be prevented. Thus, civil liability for negligence, unlike immu-
nity, would provide an incentive to a caseworker to gather
information necessary to make a proper foster care placement.
Third, the Babcock court maintained that the adversarial
nature of the proceeding would provide an adequate check on
191. See Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1987).
192. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 102, 768 P.2d 491-92.
193. See id. at 102-03, 768 P.2d at 491-92. The Babcock court expressed concern
that the fear of liability might even cause the caseworker's written report to be
distorted. See id. See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332 (1983).
194. If the caseworker fails to discover information, the court's approach in
Babcock would protect that failure as if the caseworker were withholding it.
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the thoroughness of the proceeding. 195 The court believed that
cross-examination and argument would adequately protect
against negligence."9 In Babcock, both of these techniques
failed. The court failed to consider that the specific foster-care
placement usually occurs after the dependency proceeding. It
is not an issue during the adversarial proceeding. Additionally,
in many cases, dependency proceedings are uncontested
because the natural parents have relinquished or abandoned
the child, in which case there will be no cross-examination or
argument. Furthermore, the caseworker has the best access to
information and is in the best position to make decisions based
on that information, whether or not the natural parent is pres-
ent to contest the proceeding. If the caseworker lacks correct
information, it is unlikely to be discovered during the judicial
proceeding. Therefore, the adversarial techniques designed to
elicit the truth will not be sufficient to safeguard foster-care
placement. Trial techniques will not uncover negligence occur-
ing during foster-care placement because such negligence is
likely to occur after the judicial proceeding.
Finally, the court declared that civil suits are redundant
and expensive and that the court should favor finality of judg-
ments."9 However, the Babcock court itself noted that the
plaintiffs were not re-litigating the facts at issue during the
dependency proceeding when the Babcock court determined
that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred by res judicata. 98
The plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the placement in foster
care, not by the initiation of the dependency proceeding.'
The injury that occurs when a child is placed in danger by neg-
ligent foster-care placement is also distinct from an injury that
occurs because the caseworker failed to remove a child from
the parental home.2" Immunizing the state from liability for
the damages it causes by a negligent placement will leave the
195. Babcock, 112 Wash. 2d at 102, 768 P.2d at 492.
196. Id. at 102-103, 768 P.2d at 491-92.
197. Id. at 103, 768 P.2d at 492.
198. Id. at 92-93, 768 P.2d at 486-87.
199. See id. at 94, 768 P.2d at 487.
The only issues actually determined by the juvenile court at any of the many
hearings held in the Long/Babcock cases were those set forth in RCW
13.34.130, which governs the disposition of children found to be dependent and
in need of care. None of those issues is identical to the issues raised by the
plaintiffs' claims for negligence, alienation or outrage.
Id.
200. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 201, n.9 (1989).
[Vol. 14:383
Babcock v. State
children without a remedy for the resulting harm. Conse-
quently, a negligence suit for damages resulting from foster-
care placement would not be superfluous and would be a just
remedy for the injury caused.0 1
Admittedly, there is the problem that potential individual
liability for caseworkers may dissuade anyone from entering
the profession. Likewise, it is likely that the individual
caseworker will be judgement proof,2 "2 leaving the injured
child with no real remedy. A better solution would be to
require the state to indemnify its caseworker-employees for
their negligent acts. Holding the state responsible for the neg-
ligent conduct of its employees would focus the deterrent
effect of liability on the administrative structure.0 3 The state
would then have an incentive to improve its selection, training,
and supervision of caseworkers. 2°4 The imposition of liability
will stretch the already strained resources of DSHS and, per-
haps, divert funds from the initiation of dependencies. How-
ever, the imposition of liability would decrease the abuse of
foster children, who are particularly vulnerable to the risk of
maltreatment,25 and would increase the skills of caseworkers.
201. Similarly, the federal court granted absolute immunity to assuage the fear of
liability which the federal court believed would compromise the caseworker's
judgment and deprive the juvenile court of information necessary to make its decision.
Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1989). The federal court applied the test of
whether immunity would protect the public interest in having judicial participants
perform their functions without fear of having to defend their actions in a civil
lawsuit. Id. at 502. Fear of liability is not a proper standard for the test. When a
wrongful action rises to the level of negligence, it should cause a concern for liability.
The federal court's test would immunize negligence because a party might be liable;
liability is attached because negligence occurs; thus, if negligence occurs, the party is
immune. The federal court has devised a circular process whereby actions which rise
to the level of a suit for negligence are protected because negligence can result in a
lawsuit.
The federal court sought to apply immunity based on the goals that could be
furthered by protecting judicial participants. The federal court attempted to protect
caseworkers who initiate proceedings from suits by angry parents and to protect
statements made in court. Those goals are admirable. But the federal court's protective
test extended too far. The federal court failed to distinguish between information that
comes out during the judicial proceeding and information that the caseworker should
gather outside the courtroom, which the juvenile court relies upon in making its
decision. Actions that occur outside the courtroom should not be immunized on the
basis that the actor will later appear in court.
202. Comment, supra note 49, at 695.
203. Id. at 697.
204. Id.; see also supra note 186.
205. Mushlin, supra note 159, at 204.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Babcock court erred when it failed to distinguish
between the actions involved in the initiation of dependency
proceedings and the actions involved in investigating foster-
care placement. A careful reading of the cases on which judi-
cial immunity is based demonstrate that the court over-
extended the scope of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity
should be limited by an analysis of functional comparability
that includes a focus on the conduct for which immunity is
claimed in order to preserve the policies that the doctrine was
intended to protect.
Moreover, the Babcock court could have protected its legit-
imate concerns by an application of traditional negligence the-
ory to foster-care placement. For the acts involved in
establishing the dependency, no liability should attach because
otherwise the initiation of dependencies may be chilled by the
spectre of financially devastating litigation. However, once the
child has been ordered into the legal custody of DSHS, DSHS
should not be immunized from liability. Liability for the fos-
ter-care placement will not chill investigations of child abuse,
but it will encourage reasonable care in the investigations of
foster-care homes.
The limiting principle proposed here is hardly radical. At
its most fundamental, it is nothing more than an application of
the maxim: where the reason stops, there stops the rule.2'
The policies for granting absolute immunity to judicial acts are
not fulfilled by the extension of immunity to ministerial acts
performed outside the court. The Washington Supreme Court
should recognize the distinction and protect children that the
state takes into its care.
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